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Betting On Germany?
If Britain's newspapers are to be believed, the government is staking rather a lot on regime change in Germany this autumn. The theory goes that the current chancellor Gerhard Schröder, who has subcontracted his nation's foreign policy to France, will be replaced by the supposedly more sympathetic opposition leader Angela Merkel. In reality, only a lunatic would allow European policy to ride on this outcome.
First, even though Schröder is cruising for a bruising in the opinion polls, a lot can happen in three months and the chancellor is nothing if not a survivor. This time, he won't be able to exploit anti-Bush sentiment: Unfortunately for Schröder, the US has no plans to invade another Middle Eastern nation. In any case, Schröder will not be keen to draw attention to that part of the world - Iran's newly elected president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad has already announced that under him, the nation will continue to pursue its aggressive nuclear policy. The 'nice cop' trio of Germany, Britain and France, who had hoped to persuade Iran to put its quest for nukes on ice will see Ahmadinejad's position as a brusque rejection of their overtures.
Perhaps the chancellor is banking on another summer of floods? In 2002, Schröder was expected to lose by a wide margin too. As luck would have it, there was the small matter of the Iraq build-up, a dodgy slush-funds scandal afflicting the opposition CDU party and then, in late August, the Mother of All Floods hit Germany. Schröder's can-do reaction to the disaster was widely admired and defying pollsters, he won reelection. As various environmental agencies have issued reports predicting that freak weather is likely to become a fixture across Europe in the next decades, perhaps the chancellor could be forgiven for spending the next month performing a rain dance.
Most pundits, however, reckon that this time Schröder's number is well and truly up. His party's recent lurch towards cheap left-wing populism might salvage some votes from Germans who might otherwise have drifted towards leftist splinter parties, but with twice as many voters claiming to support the CDU as Schröder's SPD, things look bleak. (Incidentally, that populism: The SPD's president, Franz "locusts" Müntefering, has announced a three-point surtax on the very wealthy as a keystone of the party's election policy. The tax has been on the wish-list of some SPD activists for years. Müntefering himself admits that the tax will only bring in a couple of million euros each year, but it is intended "more as a psychological than as a fiscal step." In other words, not enough funds will be raised to do anything to improve the lot of Germany's poor, but radicals will delight that the rich are punished. Some nations use tax cuts as psychological incentives to success. Germany proposes tax rises to raise the morale of disgruntled extremists. This explains rather a lot about how Germany ended up in the mess it is in.)
Schröder's 2002 opponent Edmund Stoiber, head of the Bavarian Christian Social Union, has reportedly demanded the post of foreign minister as the price of his support for Angela Merkel. If Tony Blair's cheerleaders are excited about Merkel, they will be positively ecstatic about the propect of Stoiber taking over from Joschka Fischer.
On the face of it, Blair would find little in common with the current prime minister of Bavaria. Stoiber's state has numerous farmers who would oppose any reform of the Common Agricultural Policy. He's also a conservative Eurosceptic, who believes that the EU has reached its limits of expansion - and who reckons that Turkish membership is against reason and God. Stoiber is also opposed to further immigration.
Not exactly a natural ally for the pro-immigration, pro-expansion (particularly Turkey), anti-CAP Blair then. However, the British will take heart from Stoiber's reported opposition to EU federalism and his supposedly liberal economic views. Moreover, Blair believes that he can win the argument on CAP, Turkey and immigration. He needs allies, not an audience, on liberal reform, and as for his recent conversion to anti-federalism, Blair will welcome anyone who promises to slow down the pace of political integration with open arms.
But how much would Stoiber want to reform? And, even if he did want to change Germany's place in the EU, how much would he be able to?
When it comes to EU policy, EURSOC does not like to think it belongs in the ranks of despairing conservatives who, like their counterparts who opposed the Iraq war, believe that Europe, like the Arab world, will always resist change. That said, reversing Germany's European policy presents even optimists like us with apparently insurmountable obstacles. While Germany's junior partner relationship with France is perhaps the most visible manifestation of its European malaise, there exists an entire strata in German political life dedicated to the discredited vision of "ever-closer union." German diplomats embody this vision, and an unquestioned federalist dynamic has dominated German EU policy for years. Imagine dismantling this hugely powerful political apparatus and replacing it with one dedicated to democracy and asserting the rule of nation states. Imagine, too, the institutional resistance to such a change: It would be worse than attempting to force Britain's Foreign Office out of its Arabist mindset, and perhaps just as difficult of ridding the Quai d'Orsay of its anti-Israel tradition.
In some respects, the best the British can hope for is a German European policy slightly less hostile than the present one.
Merkel, less experienced and less outspoken than Stoiber, would have an equally tough job. Change in Germany happens slowly, built up from consensual decisions and compromise. Germany may need radical change, but that is easier said than done. Merkel is no "Frau Thatcher" - again, even if she wanted to be. Blair may be among the first to offer himself as an ally for economic reform in Europe, but it is extremely unlikely the new chancellor's first act will be to break with recent history by closely aligning herself with Britain.
On the plus side, it was reported last year that many in Germany's political class were questioning the wisdom of Schröder's strategy of tying his fortunes so closely to those of France. Following its rejection of the EU constitution France has embarked on a period of introspection. Its despised leader, Jacques Chirac, has been reduced to flailing wildly at Tony Blair. This decline in his closest ally's status must be embarrassing for Schröder personally and for the nation as a whole. A revision of Germany's union with France must follow the German election, at least until Chirac departs, and even then Germany's government should resist the temptation to try to kickstart the old Franco-German motor. While economically and politically an allegiance with Britain would benefit both nations, Germans would probably be content to rediscover their status as an "honest broker" between France and Britain. Under Merkel, Germany will agree with much of what France says about Europe. Crucially, however, it won't agree with all France says. And again, this is probably as good as Blair will get.
Germany used to be a dynamic, forward looking nation that looked forward with optimism to EU expansion. With a "foot in both camps" of western and central Europe, it seemed better placed than most to exploit the opportunities presented by the new Europe. One can't blame Schröder alone for the collapse in Germany's morale, but if German voters boot him out of office this autumn, one cannot help but feel that any replacement would be make a better job than he has. If Merkel wins, rebuilding Germany will be her priority: Europe, and Britain, will have to wait.
