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The Battle For Europe
The EU constitution may lie a-moulderin' in the grave but the constitutional debate goes marching on. Today, the Netherlands votes on the treaty: A no is expected from the Dutch, too, which should in theory finish the constitution off.
Not so, say some in the EU (and some worried sceptics). Eurocrats warn that just because the bloody-minded French and the awkward Dutch have rejected the treaty, that should not prevent "the will of the people" in the rest of Europe from being followed. In other words, nine nations have already ratified the treaty (all but one through parliamentary, rather than popular votes). It would be undemocratic to allow the minority (France, maybe Holland) to hold up the wishes of the majority.
This argument is so much bilge: The EU constitution must be ratified by all member states or it is not enforceable. Are Eurocrats suggesting a supranational government is already in place, and that France should have the constitution forced upon it by majority votes in other states?
If rejections from Holland and France are not good enough, then Britain should seize the opportunity and call a referendum early, finishing the treaty off, and perhaps showing some solidarity with the French for getting the rejection process in motion in the first place.
Other nations who have promised referenda should follow, allowing voters from another half-dozen countries to stamp down the constitution before Eurocrats can revive it.
Of course, Tony Blair is unlikely to take this course. If anything, the French result has given him what must be a welcome breathing space after a hectic period in office. Indeed, the morning after the French vote, he called for "a period of reflection" on the direction of Europe.
Britain takes the rotating EU presidency in July. What was expected to be a six-month propagandafest designed to soften up British voters before the 2006 referendum is likely to be a post-mortem of the constitution, and one in which Europe's three major players will not be in a mood to hurry to conclusions on where to head off next.
Some observers, EURSOC included, reckoned that Blair would stand down after the British vote (we even speculated that he might go earlier, perhaps at the end of Britain's presidency in December, thus allowing his more popular heir, Gordon Brown, to win over more voters than the PM might be able to). The French Non gives him much more freedom to chose his exit.
Jacques Chirac, France's president, was severely damaged by Sunday's vote, and domestic rather than European concerns are likely to dominate his agenda for the next six months. Desperate to save what is left of his presidency's reputation, he will at some stage make a play for a new, (even more) pro-France version of the European Union, but the failure of his last grand strategy has chastened him, while his arrogance in calling the vote in the first place has hardly endeared him to his fellow EU leaders.
Another concern for Chirac is the fate of his closest ally, Germany's floundering chancellor Gerhard Schröder. Schröder hopes to call a general election before the end of September. If he can persuade Germany's parliament and courts to give him the green light, he will be too busy campaigning to save his hide at home to become too involved in EU negotiations. In any case, he and his Social Democrat Party are expected to lose the election - and his likely successor, Angela Merkel, is believed to have more interest in mending relations with eastern Europe and the United States than keeping the decrepit Franco-German motor running.
Despite Blair's hope for reflection, Chirac's embarrassment and Schröder's busy schedule, EU leaders get together on the 16 June, and the rejection of the constitution is certain to head the agenda.
EURSOC would advise the prime minister to be prepared to come out fighting. Liberal reform of the EU's economy has always been top of Britain's wish list. Both sides in the French constitutional debate raised the spectre of liberalism to frighten voters - and Schröder's minor reforms are thought to have been major contributors to his poll defeat. Neither Chirac nor Schröder will be in the mood to countenance further reform - and, on the contrary, Chirac will likely call for greater protectionism.
The FT senses this is Blair's moment. Echoing its sister publication The Economist's claim last week that Blair was "spoiling for a fight" with France's far right and rejectionist left, it says that the "leadership vacuum" in Europe offers the British PM the perfect opportunity to place his fight for reform at centre stage in the presidency.
In the Guardian, Johnathan Freedland goes further, commenting that optimists have spotted a "Blair-shaped hole" at the heart of Europe. Freedland warns that a set of very bad options faces Eurocrats following the French vote - to carry on as usual, ignoring the referendum or to expect France to vote again at a later stage being the worst. However, much in Europe has gone Britain's way in recent years (the optimists claim). Blair could put the constitution into "deep freeze" and concentrate on rearranging the EU to deliver what European voters really want: Jobs, immigration controls, security.
Wishful thinking? Probably. As Freedland remarks, an imagined surfeit of Atlanticist liberalism turned French voters against the EU constitution in the first place - it would be over optimistic to imagine they would buy the same from a man many on France's left view as the Butcher of Baghdad.
Still, Blair's visionary streak, and his admirable fighting spirit could combine to make this EU leadership role irresistible. Cometh the time, cometh the man, as they say. If Blair fancied being really heroic, he might even go to his fellow leaders with a package of tough-but-necessary reforms, designed to make Europe a prosperous free trade zone on the UK model. If France and Germany (and Belgium, and Italy...) aren't up for the challenge, well, forge ahead and let them wallow in their failure. They will be welcome to join when their internal debate has progressed to a level that would allow a liberal leap.
It would be ironic, wouldn't it, if Britain was responsible for the creation of a real two-speed Europe: One of fast-reforming, vibrant and open nations, and another of stagant, protectionist has-beens.
