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Up In Arms
Collin May writes for Eursoc:
This has been a busy week for European diplomacy as French president Jacques Chirac was in China drumming up business while calling for an end to an EU arms embargo against the Asian giant, Italy’s Silvio Berlusconi was doing the same to end sanctions against Libya and the EU foreign ministers were busy sorting it all out.
But let’s begin with Libya. Now that Libya’s come in from the cold, revealing its weapons programs and paying compensation to the victims of Libyan sponsored terrorist acts, Italy felt it was about time the EU dropped its sanctions against the country, something the US has already done. Part of the reason for Italy’s position may have been pressure from Berlusconi’s friend George W. Bush, but from Italy’s point of view the move has other practical significance. Italy is plagued with illegal North African immigrants showing up at its ports in boats full to overflowing. Berlusconi wants the ban lifted so Italy can work with Libya, providing it with technology needed but banned under the sanctions, in order to monitor the flow of illegal immigrants from North Africa. And to his credit, the European foreign ministers have agreed to drop the sanctions – a diplomatic victory for Berlusconi.
At the same time, France’s Jacques Chirac has been in China, his primary mission being to increase trade between the two countries. Right now, France lags behind both the United States and other European powers, such as Germany, in the amount of trade it does with the Chinese.
But this wasn’t all Chirac spoke about during his time in Asia. He also made two other points, points which are intimately related. On one occasion, Chirac remarked that the world is in danger of falling victim to the standardization of American values. Now, when we hear this sort of statement from the mouth of France’s esteemed leader, we can take this to mean two things. First, he regrets that the diversity of world cultures is under threat from the domination of one culture – which in itself isn’t necessarily a condemnation of that culture; rather it can be seen as regret about the loss of differentiating elements. But then comes the second meaning, which is precisely to say that American culture is not really worth emulating, that it is a vast, uncivilized monolith that degrades all it touches. This is always Jacques Chirac’s double entendre.
In any case, Chirac then went further. He called for the EU to lift its ban on arms sales to China, just as Berlusconi had done in relation to Libya. The reason said ban was implemented in the first place was as a reaction to the massacres in Tiananmen Square in 1989. But to Chirac’s mind, this was something from “another time,” something to be forgotten. And after all, if Libya gets a second chance, why not China? Though one must wonder exactly what China has done to deserve this new consideration? Further, when asked about human rights in China, Chirac noted he’d discretely mentioned the issue to the Chinese, but that these matters require subtlety and finesse – the French specialty, though the East Europeans, lectured by Chirac about the virtues of silence during the build up to the Iraq war, may not quite agree.
Not surprisingly, France is at odds with the United States on the issue. The US has opposed lifting the ban because it feels China hasn’t done enough to demonstrate reform in the area of human rights, and that China would likely use improved weapons technology to threaten Taiwan along with other neighbors. The European foreign ministers, it seems, agreed as they decided that further study of the situation was needed, and until that time, the ban would remain.
In the end, Chirac’s support for lifting the ban is largely a diplomatic maneuver designed to endear him to the Chinese. And, given that the US already has a more extensive trade relationship with China than France, it’s clear that France has some work to do in the endearment department. Still, there are good arguments against lifting the ban, given the size, importance and potential military might of what is still a communist dictatorship employing rather brutal political repression. The same cannot be said of the much weaker Libya.
But to some extent, this is exactly the sort of rival to the US that France wants to see develop, and rather than regarding this as a cynical move on Chirac’s part, we should perhaps see it as the typical French diplomatic posture. Since the Suez Crisis in the 1950’s, France has sought, often not too successfully, to align itself with potential counters to American influence. This did not mean that France would simply take the side of, say, the Soviets – it rarely did. But France has always preferred a free hand for itself in international affairs coupled with the existence of a strong adversary for the US. With the end of the Soviet Union, France is both looking to act as a counter to the US and assist other powers that harbor similar goals. And incidentally, this arrangement would not be particularly multi-polar in its effects, but bipolar.
In short, France is both amplifying its Cold War role and resurrecting its centuries-old hostility to the Anglo-Saxon world. In many ways, the end of the Soviet Union has allowed France to return to a more self-indulgent and perhaps more naturally French foreign policy. And indeed, the same might be said of other European nations as well. Italy is again befriending Libya. Spain is making overtures to Morocco. France is cozying up to nations often hostile to the supposed values of the pays des droits de l’homme.
But the reaction of the Anglo-Saxons should not simply be one of dismissive scorn that places France in the category of irredeemable enemy. Certainly France is working to undermine American dominance in the world, but this is exactly the situation faced by the English since that country took on the mantle of steward of the European continental balance. The English knew, or should have known, that France was constantly seeking dominance on the continent, which necessarily went against the British policy of assuring such dominance was never achieved. France wasn’t unique in doing this since Spain and Germany did the same thing. France’s uniqueness lies rather in its willingness to ally itself with the least savory of nations and forces in order to achieve dominance. It was, after all, a huge scandal to Christian Europe when France befriended the Muslim Ottoman Turks in order to undermine the advance of the Catholic Hapsburgs. Similarly, during the Cold War and continuing today, we are often shocked by French affiliations with everyone from Saddam to Mugabe, from Arafat to Castro, all in the name of subtle diplomacy.
In reality, this is how France has always conducted its diplomacy, and it has had mixed results, especially as most other European nations cast a suspicious eye on French intentions, no matter the issue. As such, we should not be surprised that European foreign ministers agreed to acquiesce in Italy’s request to lift sanctions against Libya, but were less accommodating to the French desire to end the arms ban against China. The other Europeans know the desires for glory in the French heart all too well.
Still, I’m not suggesting that this means the Anglo-Saxons, and especially the Americans, should no longer deal with the French, or even work with them, at times. France perpetually seeks to undermine, to embarrass and to scuttle American dominance in the world. It does it through the EU, through alliances with like-minded European leftists and with foreign powers whenever possible. Naturally, China is a prime target. At the same time, France often finds itself running into a brick wall. West European governments, depending on whether the left or right is in power, will alternatively switch between a pro-American or pro-French policy (pro-French policy being equivalent to pro-European), allowing the French a degree of leverage when their allies are in ascendancy. Unfortunately for France, Britain and East Europe are rather more solidly pro-American regardless of who comes to power domestically. As such, France runs into something of a problem.
Moreover - and this is to the credit of the British and their mighty empire - the Americans do have the advantage of the Anglosphere, as it is sometimes called. Australia recently re-elected a staunchly pro-American government. Hong Kong, despite its incorporation into China, retains its democratic memory and preserves a link within China to the English tradition of parliamentary democracy. India, the jewel of the British crown, is increasingly becoming an American ally. And here we should note that all that outsourcing of American jobs to India is not without its political implications. In some regards, India combined with the US is seen as a possible force for containment against a growing China. (My homeland of Canada, however, is a slightly more complicated issue with various regions of the country holding their own specific views on relations with Britain and the US.)
So, France will continue its efforts, often vain, to counter the US. This should not be seen as a simply hostile act though. Rather, the US will have to consider it more in the manner of the British, who understood that France was a fellow democracy, but one that was constantly acting as if it wanted to be the only democracy – not a particularly democratic intention. Americans have a habit of obsessing over whether the world likes them or not. France has no such concern and even is willing to exploit this American sensitivity. The Anglo-Saxons need not take the bait. It is difficult to be the greatest power in the world, as the English can attest, but part of that greatness is to allow the smaller players to engage in their own games, but always aware that such games can be dangerous if not properly understood and dealt with.
Collin May also contributes to Innocents Abroad
