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The Bear Necessities
As President Dmitry Medvedev is inaugurated, Russia is shaping up to be one of the major foreign policy issues facing Europe this decade.
Following on from yesterday's review of an investigation into the Litvinenko killing which took a more-or-less pro-Moscow line, we provide some balance in the shape of a much more critical overview of Vladimir Putin's legacy, this time from the Guardian.
"The fragility of his achievement in orchestrating Russia's national revival is about to become apparent", writes David Clark, "The nation's demographic profile remains awful, with average male life expectancy at 59 and a population set to shrink by up to a third over the next four decades. For all the bombastic talk about Russia's return to the top table of world power, Putin still hasn't found a way to stop large numbers of Russian men drinking themselves into an early grave.
"A more immediate problem, and one entirely of Putin's own creation, is the looming crisis in the Russian energy sector, newly restored to state control by means of intimidation and outright illegality. Productive enterprises have been forcibly taken over by inefficient state companies that have failed to invest in replacement production and will soon struggle to meet domestic demand, let alone export commitments. This means that even if energy prices remain high, the foreign earnings that have boosted Russian growth could start to dwindle unless corrective action is taken soon."
Clark argues that Putin and his successor have little room for manoeuvre even with the average patriotic Russians who make up the bulk of their support. Should times get tough, popular opposition could emerge and: "there is no guarantee that this opposition would assume a liberal and democratic character. A population fed on anti-foreigner paranoia and chauvinist revivalism could easily take a different course."
The main thrust of Clark's myth-dispelling article is how the European Union should react to Russia, and how a nation of 142 million people is dictating terms to a block three and a half times its size. He puts much of this down to "lamentable weakness and division", and adds that the EU has the opportunity to become more assertive during negotiations on free trade and cooperation due this summer.
Lamentable weakness, anyway. Many EU nations have a feeble record of standing up to Moscow, for sentimental reasons (Paris has always had a soft spot for Russia; former President Jacques Chirac saw Moscow as a crucial element in the "multi-polar world" he hoped for) as well as financial ones (former German Chancellor Gerhard Schröder cultivated friendly terms with Putin and was rewarded with a well-paid job in an energy company). Italy's Silvio Berlusconi styles himself as a close personal friend of Vladimir Putin's and the Russian leader was the first he met after winning last month's general election.
But division? In many respects, Europe is always going to be divided on Russia. There are good, as well as bad reasons for this. Russia's energy resources mean the west needs it; western "economic champions", those power companies and manufacturers which enjoy special relationships with certain western European states, also have deals with Russian energy giants which governments are anxious to protect.
Disappointingly, NATO feels increasingly irrelevant to many Europeans. However, it remains the continent's main guarantee of defence, and Moscow continues to see it as a deadly rival. On one hand, national capitals are calling for warmer relations with Moscow; meanwhile, the US has secured NATO's backing for defensive missile bases to be located in Poland and the Czech Republic, a policy Moscow fiercely opposes. The US and its supporters argue the missiles protect western Europe from attacks originating in Iran and the Middle East; Moscow says the shield weakens Russia's deterrent.
Moscow - again, for mischievous as well as understandable reasons - sees this power play as damaging the fragile balance between powers which has "kept the peace" since the end of the Cold War, and has responded with a series of aggressive military exercises itself.
So the EU is stuck between the US and Russia, between NATO and national capitals. Of course a unified EU policy approach to Russia would go some way towards solving these problems, but who would write it? And how to balance the demands of pro-Moscow governments with those who have every reason to loathe the Russians?
As we reported last year, Russia now claims much of the resources-rich underwater shelf below the Arctic Circle as its territory. Denmark (via Greenland) the USA and Canada (NATO members) could have competing claims. How do the Danes persuade other EU nations to support their case? Smaller nations are said to benefit from the larger backing of the EU, but at what cost?
Former Soviet states such as Estonia have robustly anti-Moscow governments, not least because Russian agents brought their internet infrastructure grinding to a halt over a war graves issue. The EU consensus is that these "little nations" aren't mature enough to handle proper diplomacy - but at the same time, can they be expected to sign up to a conciliatory policy towards a nation they see as a dangerous aggressor?
EU federalists see the obvious solution in a unified foreign policy for Moscow, and then, presumably, for the rest of the world. Russia, for them, is the big test case: Europe's biggest and most powerful neighbour, a nation we need but feel deeply uncomfortable dealing with; one which could prove the biggest testing ground to date for the EU's much-vaunted "soft power" and democratic lure. During the Cold War, NATO defined the terms through which we discussed Russia, while the embassies run by the big western powers were the most important after Washington DC. Today, those embassies are less central to central government policy, where the focus has shifted to China and the Middle East. Governments are muddled; citizens believe the US (through NATO) is picking a quarrel few Europeans want. A perfect opportunity for a single foreign policy - and even a unified European Army?
Moscow's policy towards Europe has been "divide and rule"; in many cases, Europeans are happy to be divided, as a unified policy, dreamed up by federalists, energy giants and competing pro-and anti-Moscow blocs, could be worse than the the current problems (not least because major players who don't get what they want will continue to operate independently). Nevertheless Clark does suggest some ideas through which Europeans might be able to put relations with Moscow on a more realistic basis.
